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Abstract. Organization concepts and models are increasingly being adopted for
the design and specification of multi-agent systems. Agent organizations can be
seen as mechanisms of social order, created to achieve global (or organizational)
objectives by more or less autonomous agents. In order to develop a theory on
the relation between organizational structures, organizational objectives and the
actions of agents fulfilling roles in the organization a theoretical framework is
needed to describe organizational structures and actions of (groups of) agents.
Current logical formalisms focus on specific aspects of organizations (e.g. power,
delegation, agent actions, or normative issues) but a framework that integrates
and relates different aspects is missing. Given the amount of aspects involved and
the subsequent complexity of a formalism encompassing them all, it is difficult
to realize. In this paper, a first step is taken to solve this problem. We present
a generic formal model that enables to specify and relate the main concepts of
an organization (including, activity, structure, environment and others) so that
organizations can be analyzed at a high level of abstraction. However, for some
aspects we use a simplified model in order to avoid the complexity of combining
many different types of (modal) operators.
1 Introduction
The growing complexity of (information) systems, characterized by distribution, het-
erogeneity, openness and dynamicity has lead to an increasing interest in organiza-
tional concepts by MAS researchers. As in human organizations, the specification of
an explicit organization for a MAS helps coordinating the agents’ autonomous behav-
ior [30,2]. Traditional design of MAS is agent-centered, that is, mainly concerned with
the representation of an agent’s internal knowledge or behavior. Recent research has
pointed out that an agent-centered perspective on MAS has several problems. Accord-
ing to Jennings [31]: “the patterns and the outcomes of the interactions are inherently
unpredictable, and predicting the behavior of the overall system based on its constituent
components is extremely difficult (sometimes impossible) because of the high likelihood
of emergent (and unwanted) behavior”.
A possible approach to organization in MAS is to look at how human organizations
are organized and try to apply results from many decades of research in Organizational
Theory (OT) to agent systems. Researchers in computer science and artificial intelli-
gence are increasingly adopting concepts from the OT field to design more efficient and
flexible distributed systems ([43,6,20]). In some of this work organizational structures
are used in the design phase of the MAS and agents built as a kind of refinement of
these structures. Thus agents and organizations are not independent entities. In earlier
work, we have propagated to view organizations as separate entities from agents that
also exist after the MAS is created. This is especially important in cases of open agent
systems, where agents created by third parties can enter and leave. Taking this point of
view, agents are not just fulfilling roles of an organization and following the patterns of
interaction set out by the organizational structures. They have an independent existence
(like in human organizations people have an existence independent from the organiza-
tion). Following this approach, it becomes very important to describe the exact relation
between the organizational entities on the one hand and the agents on the other hand.
In earlier work, we have taken an OT view to define organizations as a set of entities
regulated by mechanisms of social order and created by more or less autonomous actors
to achieve common objectives [11]. However, due to its nature, OT research tends to be
not very formal from a computational perspective, which makes it difficult to move
from its use as a concept or paradigm towards applying social and organizational con-
cepts for the formalization of MAS social concepts. On the other hand, existing formal
models are often limited to a specific domain and are difficult to validate [27]. That is,
in general, logic lends itself better for the detailed analysis of one particular aspect of
reality.
The above considerations provide two different motivations for this work. On the
one hand, the need for a formal representation of organizations, with their environment,
objectives and agents in a way that enables to analyze their partial contributions to the
performance of the organization in a changing environment. On the other hand, the need
for such a model to be realistic enough to incorporate the more ‘pragmatic’ consider-
ations faced by real organizations. Most existing formal models lack this realism, e.g.
either by ignoring temporal issues, or by taking a very restrictive view on the controlla-
bility of agents, or by assuming complete control and knowledge within the system (cf.
[46,42]).
Much of our own work in the last decade, has also focused on providing detailed
formalisms of a specific aspect of social aspects of agent systems (e.g. norms, respon-
sibility, delegation, counts-as,...). However, to date there are no comprehensive models
that integrate all these issues. One of the reasons for this lack, is that a complete model
is necessarily too complex to be done at once. In this paper, we take the middle ground
by incorporating many aspects that are required for realism, but sometimes take simple
formalizations in order to keep the logic manageable, where we refer to other work that
could be used to extend some of the aspects wherever possible. The main goal of this ar-
ticle is rather an analysis of organizational structures and their function on a high level,
that enables to represent the foundations of agent organizations without considering all
the details involved. This framework includes all main concepts involved in organiza-
tional modeling, and describes a kind of placeholders where later on more complete
theories for detailed concepts can be inserted. In a sense, the work presented in this
paper simplifies many of the concepts for which powerful logics have been developed,
but this simplification enables the integration of all aspects in one formalism. E.g. we
will reduce the concept of responsibility to the concept of (organizational) initiative.
Initiative can be seen as part of responsibility. It indicates that a certain role in the orga-
nization is made responsible to perform a task and the initiative to do something about
it lays with that role.
Organizational analysis and planning aim to capture the functioning and develop-
ment of organizations that account for the ways in which organizations respond to and
bring about changes, and to design an organization’s structure accordingly to bring
about greater efficiency. Different approaches to organizational analysis and planning
have evolved from the rational view propagated by Taylor at the beginning of the 20th
century [44], to cognitive models of organizations, and include also holistic and so-
ciotechnical system views. These views bring forward the need to identify structures,
components, objectives and environment as separate but interelated aspects of organi-
zation [28]. This implies that formal models for organizations must meet the following
requirements:
1. represent notions of ability and activity of agents, without requiring knowledge
about the specific actions available to a specific agent (open environments),
2. accept limitedness of agent capability,
3. represent the ability and activity of a group of agents,
4. deal with temporal issues, especially the fact that activity takes time,
5. represent the concept of ’being responsible’ for the achievement of a given state of
affairs,
6. represent global (organizational) objectives and their dependency on agents’ activ-
ity, by relating activity and organizational structure,
7. represent organizations in terms of organizational roles
8. relate roles and agents (role enacting agents)
9. reason about organizational workflows and task dependencies (including partial
ordering of tasks, parallelism, incompatibilities),
10. represent organizational dynamics (evolution of the organization over time, changes
of the agent population),
11. deal with resource limitedness and the dependency of activity on resources (e.g.
costs),
12. deal with normative issues (representation of boundaries for action and the viola-
tion thereof)
In the remainder of this paper, we will describe a thoroughly revised version of the
Logic for Agent Organizations (LAO) introduced in [14] that will be increasingly ex-
tended to include most of these requirements. The introduction of LAO, based on CTL*
is done incrementally starting with the first requirements and extend it successively to
incorporate more complex requirements. The formalism presented in this paper does
not yet include requirements 9 to 12. These issues have been dealt with in some of our
other work, e.g. we dealt with normative issues extensively in e.g. [25]. It is a matter
for future work to connect the work reported in this article to that other research. In
the same way, more in-depth characterizations of other agency and social concepts can
be given by incorporating existing work in, e.g., power and delegation [32,5]. Where
appropriate we will indicate the place where these more elaborate theories can be sub-
stituted into the framework for the basic relations that we adopted for the present paper.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 gives the background for this research
and discusses related work. The following sections build the formal logical framework
of LAO for organizations and reorganization. In Section 3 we define the basis for or-
ganizations through abilities, activities and related concepts (which we all together call
achievementmodalities) of agents and groups. In Section 4, the formal model for orga-
nizations including structural and interaction properties is presented. Section 5 proposes
an axiomatization for LAO. Section 6 shows how LAO can be applied to provide a for-
malization of different organization types. Finally, Section 8 presents our conclusions
and directions for future work.
2 Organization Theory
We use concepts from Organization Theory (OT) as basis for this work. Even though it
can be said that OT lacks formality, its concepts have been studied and used in practice
for many years with successful results. OT definesOrganization as an entity that allows
and supports an individual (be it a person, a computer system, or an institution) to rec-
ognize its role, and the roles of others, in accomplishing collective goals. Furthermore,
OT recognizes that organizations are instruments of purpose, that is they are seen as
coordinated by intentions and objectives [34].
Furthermore, organizations are assumed to have both a structural and a strategic
component [16]. These two components are linked in the following way. The organi-
zational strategy influences contingencies such as size, innovation, diversification and
geographic distribution of the organization. These characteristics result in different co-
ordinationmechanisms. E.g. if the whole organization resides at the same physical loca-
tion informal communication can be used to react quick to any situation, but this is more
difficult when the organization is spread all over the globe. Coordination mechanisms
are also dependent on task uncertainty and task dependency. Different organizational
structures are more appropriate for different types of tasks. E.g. factories usually have
more hierarchical organization structures than consultancy companies. A change in the
strategy of the organization might change both the tasks and the contingency factors
and thus will have consequences for the organizational structure.
OT has for many decades investigated the issue of organizational structure. Organi-
zational structure has essentially two purposes [17]: (1) it facilitates the flow of infor-
mation within the organization in order to reduce the uncertainty of decision making;
and (2) it integrates organizational behavior across the parts of the organization so that
it is coordinated. Because the organizational structure is defined over the roles within
an organization and not the individual agents it also lends stability over time to the
organization. The organizational structure raises two challenges: division of labor and
coordination [36]. The design of organizational structure determines the allocation of
resources and people to specified tasks or purposes (through the roles those people ful-
fill), and the coordination of these resources to achieve organizational objectives [22].
Ideally, the organization is designed to fit its environment and to provide the information
and coordination needed for its strategic objectives.
2.1 Elements of organization
Inspired by [43], we classify components of organizations into three broad classes. The
first are (task) environmental factors, which are the components and features of the
task (such as size, time constraints, uncertainty). The second are the structural factors,
which are the components and features of the organization (such as roles, dependencies,
constraints, norms and regulations). The third class of factors are agent factors, which
are the characteristics of the individual agents concerning task capability, intelligence
(including decision making and reasoning capabilities), social awareness, etc. These
three classes of factors jointly determine the performance of the organization. To sum
up, the three main issues that must be represented in any model aimed at understanding
or specifying organizational performance or behavior are:
1. Environment/world: this is the space in which organizations exist. This space is not
completely controllable by the agents and results of agent activity are not guaran-
teed.
2. Structure: describes the roles and relationships holding in the organization, and the
strategy indicating the intentions of the organization in terms of objective(s).
3. Agents: are entities with the capability to act, that is to control the state of some
element in the environment. Agents are defined by their capabilities.
In accordance to our previous work (e.g. [11], organizational roles, like agents, are
first class concepts in our model that provide an explicit separation between organiza-
tion and the agents that act on it, and enable to separate organizational objectives from
agent goals. We therefore assume that agents do not necessarily share the objectives of
the organization.
2.2 A Scenario for Organization
The study of organizations is particularly interesting in understanding and managing
the congruence of organizations with their environment. That is, why is it that some
organization thrive under given conditions, while others fail? Due to their characteristics
of autonomy, social conformance, flexibility, collaborative problem solving, mobility,
and distributed architecture, agent based modelling and/or simulation are widely used
in the area of organization analysis. In particular, agent systems, have been advocated
for modelling supply-chain applications [21,37]. In this section we present a scenario
to illustrate the formal modelling of organizations proposed in this paper. The scenario
is based on the work described by Pelletier et al. [38] on the analysis of reorganization
of the Dutch gas pipeline transport market. Economic reforms from the last decade
have impacted a large reorganization of supply chain processes, such as the opening of
traditional monopolist markets to competition.
The classic model for the gas market was a simple linear value chain. In this situa-
tion organization is characterized by a fairly stable environment, where parties and in-
teractions are known and tasks are mostly fixed. In this situation, hierarchies are proven
to be efficient and robust [36]. The stakeholders in this situation are the state acting as
a (local) monopolist, who organizes and directs the transmission of gas from producer
to consumer by controlling and directing other parties involved, namely the trader (re-
sponsible for exchanging gas from wellhead producer to a local geographic area), the
shipper (responsible for transport of high-pressure gas from origin to destination) and
the local transport manager (responsible for the overall capacity and flow of gas).
Following the political decision on the liberalization of the gas market in the Nether-
lands, the role of the monopolist disappears and the possibility for the other partners to
directly contract each other and for multiple parties to enter the market is created. The
environment became much more dynamic, with different parties having the possibil-
ity to create and manage supply chains and new services for the costumer. When the
monopolist role is removed, the existing hierarchical structure collapses and steps must
be taken to assure that the overall organization will still be able to achieve its objec-
tives. Typically, such situation will demand extra capabilities from the parties involved
in order to coordinate their activities without control by the monopolist.
3 Formal Core of Agent Organization
In this section we present the basis of the Logic of Agent Organization (LAO) that
includes environment, agents and organization structure. We start by formally defin-
ing the environment as a set of temporally ordered set of states of affairs, or worlds.
Secondly, we define the agents (and groups) in terms of their capabilities, abilities and
activity possibilities. Finally, we will formally define organizational structure and ac-
tivity, based on responsibilities and objectives.
3.1 Environment
In OT, the environment is commonly defined as the forces outside the organization that
can impact it. The environment changes over time is not fully controlled by the organi-
zations and individuals that populate it. For a formal representation of the environment,
we use Kripke semantics to describe the environment and its changes. In the following,
a world describes an actual state of the environment, and transitions indicate the effects
of possible changes (the opportunities and threats in terms of organizational theory con-
cepts). The set of propositional variables Φ describes the vocabulary (or ontology) of
the organization domain.
We use the well-known branching time temporal logic CTL* [18] to describe basic
organization and environment concepts. For a set Φ of propositional variables, the lan-
guage, L consists of two subsets: Ls the set of state formulae and Lp the set of path
formulae, defined as follows, where we use the usual CTL* notation:A: all, E : there is,
X : next, F : future, G: always in future, and U : until.
1. true, false ∈ Ls
2. p ∈ Φ⇒ p ∈ Ls
3. ϕ, ψ ∈ Ls ⇒ ¬ϕ, (ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ Ls
4. ϕ ∈ Lp ⇒ Aϕ, Eϕ ∈ Ls
5. ϕ ∈ Ls ⇒ ϕ ∈ Lp
6. ϕ, ψ ∈ Lp ⇒ ¬ϕ, (ϕ ∨ ψ),Xϕ,Fϕ,Gϕ, ψUϕ ∈ Lp
A simple semantic structure over which formulae of L are interpreted is a tuple
M = (W,Rt, pi) (1)
where:
– W is a non empty set of states,
– Rt is a partial ordered set of (temporal) transitions between two elements of W ,
Rt :W ×W ,
– pi is a valuation function which associates each w ∈ W with the set of atomic
propositions from Φ that are true in that world, pi :W → 2Φ
Each world w ∈ W describes the propositions of Φ that are true in that world, and,
each proposition in Φ corresponds to a set of worlds where it is true. A transition be-
tween worlds represents an update of the truth value of (some) propositions in Φ. The
semantics of CTL* [18] distinguish between path and state formulae. A state formula
is interpreted wrt a state w ∈ W and a path formula is interpreted wrt a path through
the branching time structure given by Rt. A path (or trace) in Rt is a (possibly infinite)
sequence (wi, wi+1, ...), where wi, wi+1, ... ∈ W and ∀i : (wi, wi+1) ∈ Rt. We use
the convention that rt = (w0, w1, ...) denotes a path, and rt(i) denotes state i in path
rt. We write M,w |= ϕ (resp. M, rt |= ϕ) to denote that state formula ϕ (resp. path
formula ϕ) is true in structureM at state w (resp. path rt).
Definition 1 (World Semantics). The rules for the satisfaction relation |= for state
and path formulae are defined as:
M,w |= ⊤
M,w |= p iff p ∈ pi(w), where p ∈ Φ
M,w |= ¬ϕ iff notM,w |= ϕ
M,w |= ϕ ∨ ψ iffM,w |= ϕ orM,w |= ψ
M,w |= Aϕ iff ∀rt ∈ paths(W,Rt), if rt(0) = w thenM, rt |= ϕ
M,w |= Eϕ iff ∃rt ∈ paths(W,Rt), rt(0) = w andM, rt |= ϕ
M, rt |= p iffM, rt(0) |= p, where p ∈ Φ
M, rt |= ¬ϕ iff notM, rt |= ϕ
M, rt |= ϕ ∨ ψ iffM, rt |= ϕ orM, rt |= ψ
M, rt |= Fϕ iff ∃i(M, rt(i)) |= ϕ
M, rt |= Gϕ iff ∀i(M, rt(i)) |= ϕ
M, rt |= Xpϕ iffM, rt(1) |= ϕ
M, rt |= ψUϕ iff ∃i such thatM, rt(i) |= ϕ and ∀0 ≤ k < i,M, rt(k) |= ψ
Because there are two constructs that we will use very frequently we define some ab-
breviations for them:
– Xϕ ≡ AX pϕ
– ♦ϕ ≡ AFϕ
This semantic structure enables the specification of the organization environment, with
the affairs holding in a state and the possible changes of state.
3.2 Agents and groups
The semantic structure described in the previous section does not consider the agents in
the system. Intuitively, the idea is that, in organizations, changes are for some part the
result of the intervention of (specific) agents. The languageLO for LAO is defined as an
extension of the language L described above with semantics given as an extension and
slight modification to CTL*. The semantics of LO includes the rules listed in Definition
1, and is extended with rules for the other modalities described in the remainder of this
section. Before we give a formal definition of LO we first change the semantic structure
over which formulae of LO will be interpreted and which will form the basis on which
the new modalities can be given an intuitive semantics.
MO = (Ψ,A,W,Rt, T, pi, c) (2)
where:
– Ψ is a finite, non-empty set of domain facts
– W ⊆ 2Ψ is a non-empty set of states. Each state indicates a set of domain facts that
hold in that state.
– Rt is as in (1),
– pi : Ψ → Φ is an interpretation function that associates an element of Φ with an
element of Ψ .
We overload the meaning of pi by also using it to associate sets of domain facts
with sets of atomic propositions (pi : 2Ψ → 2Φ). This allows us to use pi again as an
evaluation function that associates with each world the set of atomic propositions
from Φ that are true in that world.
– A = {a1, ..., an} is a finite, non-empty set of agents,
– c : A ×W → 2Ψ is a function that associates elements of A andW with the facts
in Ψ
– T : Rt→ 2A is the set of agent labels on elements of Rt,
The first thing to notice is that we introduced a set of domain facts next to the set of
atomic propositions. This is done for two reasons. First of all the capabilities of agents
will be defined over the domain facts. I.e. agents can change the truth values of atomic
propositions that are linked to the domain facts (and formulas derived from them). How-
ever, agents are not capable to control all possible atomic propositions. Secondly, unlike
the set of atomic propositions, the set of domain facts is per definition finite. Although
this limits the expressiveness of the logic, this restriction still maintains the requirement
of realism for organization models as usually the set of facts considered important for
an organization is captured in finite databases. This assumption simplifies a number
of definitions later on (allowing us to use operations on finite sets and using universal
quantification as just an abbreviation of enumeration of facts) and is not too restrictive
for the domain facts, but would be for the set of all atomic propositions.
The set of worlds is built on the set of domain facts such that we can easily connect
atomic propositions to worlds using the domain facts.
This model also contains a set of agents and two relations that link the agents to the
CTL* structure. The first relation that links agents to the original CTL* structure is c.
This relation indicates the capabilities of agents in a particular state. If p ∈ c(a, w) then
agent a has the capability to change the truth value of p when in state w. This relation
thus forms the basis of what sort of things agents are capable to influence.
The relation T links sets of agents to particular transitions. These sets of agents indicate
the agents that influence the changes on that transition. That is, for a transition rt =
(w,w′) ∈ Rt, T (rt) indicates the set of agents that indeed contribute to the changes
indicated by that transition. Moreover, for each world w ∈ W and each agent a ∈ A
we can indicate the set of transitions starting from w for which a has influence.
Definition 2 (Transition influence). For a model 3 MO = (Ψ,A,W,Rt, T, pi, c), a
world w ∈ W and an agent a ∈ A, the transition influence of a in w, Taw is defined
by: Taw = {rt|rt ∈ Rt : ∃w′ : rt = (w,w′) and a ∈ T (rt)}
Note that, at any moment, unexpected change can also occur, which is not a result of
the action of any of the agents in that world (i.e. unlabeled or partially labeled transitions
are possible).
Agent Activity. The notions of agent capability and action have been widely discussed
in MAS. In this section, we draw from work in the area of the well known logical
theory for agency and organized interaction introduced by Kanger-Lindahl-Po¨rn, more
specifically from the work of Santos et al. [42] and Governatori et al. [23]. In short,
their works assume that in realistic situations not all capabilities are always conductive
of successful action - one can attempt to achieve something but without success. Three
modal operators E, G and H are used to described these differences. The first one, E,
expresses direct and successful actions: i.e. a formula like Eiϕ means that the agent i
brings it about that ϕ, that is, ϕ is a necessary result of an action by i. The second one,
Giϕ corresponds to indirect and successful actions, i.e., Giϕ means that i ensures that
ϕ, that is, ϕ is a necessary result of an action of some agent following an action by i.
Finally, Hiϕ means that i attempts to make it the case that ϕ. The idea is that H is not
necessarily successful. An axiomatic definition of E,G andH is given in [42,23].
One of the main reasons to start from these abstract operators for actions and at-
tempts is that they allow us to conceive agents to be a kind of black boxes. We do not
have to specify which precise actions and procedures the agents actually have to ex-
ecute in order to reach a certain situation. From an organizational perspective, agents
are autonomous and have different decision mechanisms (and even architectures and/or
implementation). Only their outward behavior can be observed (i.e. agents are black
boxes for the organization) and an attempt to perform an action can only be described
if it is ‘obvious’ that the agent tried to perform an action. It means that we abstract
away from any intentional and/or volitional elements of attempts which are completely
internal to the agents. It also means that we can only state that an agent attempts to
perform an action if it at least has the capability to perform the action. This is again
justified by the organizational perspective on actions. If e.g. a university would let a
sociology lecturer try to teach a class on nuclear physics and he failed we would not
3 Note that in the remainder, we will drop the reference to the semantic model whenever it is
clear from the context.
say that this was a serious attempt, because it is obvious that this person does not have
the capability to teach this class (even though at an individual level the sociology lec-
turer might genuinely have intended to teach the class, formed intentions, etc.). This
aspect is even more obvious in agent organizations. An agent should only attempt to
see to it that a situation holds if it knows which actions it has to perform and it has these
capabilities (designed in its program, action or plan base). So, although we have used
variants of dynamic logic to characterize attempts of actions before [47] and recently
a new logic of attempt is described in [33], these are very useful to describe attempts
from an individual’s point of view, but not from an organizational perspective.
Abstract logics of agency start by defining the modal operatorE for direct, success-
ful action, and introduce the other operators, for capability, ability, attempt or indirect
action, based on the definition of E. This results in axioms such as Eaϕ → Caϕ, in-
formally meaning that if a sees to it that ϕ then a is (cap)able of ϕ. From a realistic
perspective, such a definition is pretty uninteresting. Obviously, if you indeed do some-
thing, you must have had the ability to do it, but the interesting issue is to, given one’s
capabilities, determine under which circumstances one can reach a certain state of af-
fairs. That is, to determine in which situations it can be said that Caϕ leads to Eaϕ. For
instance, if agent a is capable of achieving ϕ and also responsible and no other agent is
interfering then agent a will actually achieve ϕ.
Our approach is thus to start by giving the definition of agent capability and use this
definition to progressively introduce the definitions for ability, attempt and activity. We
furthermore provide a semantic definition of the modal operators instead of the usual
axiomatic definition. The idea is that a semantic definition helps to precisely identify
all the wanted characteristics, while a sound axiomatic system can be given on top of
these definitions. Of course, it is also possible to start with an axiomatic system and
construct a (canonical) semantic framework. However, in this case the semantics will
add little to our understanding of the fundamental properties of the modal operators.
Finally, we also agree with [23] that the assumption taken in [42] that indirect action
always implies an impossibility for direct action is rather strong, and will not use it.
Intuitively, the ability of an agent to realize a state of affairs ϕ in a worldw, depends
not only on the capabilities of the agent but also on the status of that world. Therefore,
we define the ability of a, Gaϕ to represent the case in which the agent has not only
the potential capability to establish ϕ but is currently in a state in which it has influence
over some of the possible transitions that lead to a state where ϕ holds. Thus the agent
also has an actual possibility to use its capability. The attempt by agent a to realize ϕ is
represented byHaϕ. An agent attempts to realize ϕ if ϕ holds after all states that can be
reached by a transition that is influenced by a. In our definition of attempt, an attempt
only fails in case another agent interferes and tries achieve something which prevents
ϕ to be achieved. So, we do not consider that the environment might just prevent ϕ to
be achieved with some probability. We also assume an agent only attempts to achieve
things it is capable of achieving (which does not necessarily mean the agent knows it is
capable of achieving them). In the special case in which all next possible states from a
given state are influenced by an agent a, we say that a is in-control in w, represented by
ICa. Finally, the stit operator, Eaϕ (’agent a sees to it that ϕ) represents the result of
successful action (that is, ϕ holds in all worlds following the current one). This notion
of agent activity is based on that introduced by Po¨rn [41] to represent the externally ‘ob-
servable’ consequences of an action instead of the action itself, and as such abstracts
from internal motivations of the agents. Stit can be seen as an abstract representation of
the family of all possible actions that result in ϕ.
Formally, the agent operators are defined as follows, where all definitions are in-
troduced as an extension to CTL*. Given a set A of agents, we start by defining the
language LO for LAO as an extension of L as follows:
Definition 3. Given a set A of agents, LO is such that
1. ϕ ∈ L ⇒ ϕ ∈ LO
2. a ∈ A,ϕ ∈ LO ⇒ Caϕ,Gaϕ,Haϕ,Eaϕ, ICa ∈ LO
Semantics to all of these operators are build over the semantic notion of capabilities. As
discussed above, the intuition is that an agent possesses capabilities that make action
possible. That is, in order to talk about agent activity, or, that agent a possesses the
ability to make proposition ϕ hold in some next state in a path from the current world,
we need to establish the control of the agent over the (truth) value of ϕ. For each agent
a, we partition the set of atomic facts Ψ in any world w of M in two classes: the set of
atomic facts that agent a can control, c(a, w), and the set of atomic facts that a cannot
control, Ψ\c(a, w). Given a set c(a, w) of propositional capability of a, we defineΣa ⊆
LO inductively as follows:
∀p ∈ c(a, w), pi(p) ∈ Σa,
∀p ∈ c(a, w), ¬pi(p) ∈ Σa,
∀ψ1, ψ2 ∈ Σa, ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ Σa iff 6|= ψ1 → ¬ψ2 and 6|= ψ2 → ¬ψ1
Agents can control the state of ϕ in a world, represented by Caϕ iff the agent controls
the set of atomic facts that yield ϕ true. Furthermore, LAO is defined such that no agent
can control the obvious (tautologies), and if an agent controls a fact p it also controls its
negation ¬p.
Definition 4 (Agent Capability). Given an agent a ∈ A, agent capability, Caϕ is
defined as: w |= Caϕ iff ∃w′ : w 6= w′, w′ |= ¬ϕ and ∃ψ ∈ Σa :|= ψ → ϕ
Definition 5 (Agent Ability, Attempt and Activity). Given an agent a ∈ A, agent
ability, Gaϕ, agent attempt, Haϕ, agent control, ICa, and agent activity, Eaϕ, are
defined as:
Ga: w |= Gaϕ iff w |= Caϕ and ∃(w,w′) ∈ Taw : w′ |= ϕ
Ha: w |= Haϕ iff w |= Gaϕ and ∀(w,w′) ∈ Taw : w′ |= ϕ
ICa: w |= ICa iff ∀w′ : (w,w′) ∈ Rt⇒ (w,w′) ∈ Taw
Ea: w |= Eaϕ iff w |= Haϕ ∧ ICa
Note that these definitions include the notion that action takes time by representing the
result of action in a following world.
As an example, considermodelM = ({p, q}, {a}, {w0, ..., w4}, {t1, ..., t4}, T, pi, c(a, wi) =
{p}), where i = 0, ..., 4, as depicted in figure 1. We furthermore define that (w0, w1) ∈
Taw0 . In this model, it holds that:
p, ¬q
p, q
¬p, q
¬p, ¬q
p, q
w0
w1
w2
w3
w4
t4
t1
t2
t3
Fig. 1. Example for capability, ability and attempt.
w0 |= Gap (because Cap and w1 |= p)
w0 |= Hap if Taw = {(w0, w1), (w0, w3)}
w0 6|= Ca(p ∧ q)
w0 6|= Ga(p ∧ q) (because ¬Ca(p ∧ q))
Group Activity Agents are, by definition, limited in their capabilities, that is, the set of
facts in the world that they can control. This implies that certain states of affairs can only
be reached if two or more agents cooperate to bring that state into existence. We define
control and action of a group of agents based on the combined atomic capabilities of the
agent in the group, using the normal set theoretic notions. I.e. c(Z,w) =
⋃
a∈Z c(a, w)
and TZw =
⋃
a∈Z Taw. In the same way as for single agents, we define composed ca-
pability ΣZ of a group Z as follows:
∀p ∈ CZ , p ∈ ΣZ
∀p ∈ CZ , ¬p ∈ ΣZ
∀ψ1, ψ2 ∈ ΣS , ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ∈ ΣZ iff 6|= ψ1 → ¬ψ2 and 6|= ψ2 → ¬ψ1
Table 1 gives an overview of the semantics of the C,G,H and E operators for
groups of agents. We refer the reader to [14] for a more extensive formal specification.
Table 1. Overview of group operators and their semantics
Operator Definition
Capability CZϕ w |= CZϕ iff ∃w
′ : w′ |= ¬ϕ and ∃ψ ∈ ΣZ such that w |= ψ → ϕ
Joint Capabil-
ity
JCZϕ w |= JCZϕ iff w |= CZϕ and ∀Z
′ ⊂ Z,w |= ¬CZ′ϕ
Ability GZϕ w |= GZϕ iff w |= CZϕ and ∃(w,w
′) ∈ TZw : w
′ |= ϕ
where TZw =
⋃
a∈Z
Taw
Attempt HZϕ w |= HZϕ iff w |= GZϕ and ∀(w,w
′) ∈ TZw : w
′ |= ϕ
In-control ICZ w |= ICZ iff ∀w
′ : (w,w′) ∈ R⇒ ∃a ∈ Z : a ∈ T (w,w′)
Stit EZϕ w |= EZϕ iff w |= HZϕ ∧ ICZ
4 Organization Structure in LAO
The idea behind organizations is that there are global objectives that can only be achieved
through combined agent action. One of the main reasons for creating organizations is
to provide the means for coordination that enables the achievement of organizational
objectives in an efficient manner. From the definition of group capabilities, it easily fol-
lows that groups of agents have at least as many capabilities as each of their members
and thus groups are more “powerful”. In order to achieve its objectives, it is necessary
that besides employing the relevant agents, the organization assures that their interac-
tions and responsibilities enable an efficient realization of its objectives.
According to this view of organization, even if the agents in the organization have
group control over all organizational objectives, they still need to coordinate their ac-
tivities in order to efficiently achieve those objectives. Furthermore, in most cases, the
objectives of the organization are only known to a few of the agents in the organization,
who may have no control over those objectives. It is therefore necessary to organize the
agents in a way that enables objectives to be passed to those agents that can effectively
realize them. We need therefore to extend our groups to include coordinating and task
allocation concepts.
Formally this is achieved by adding a set of organizational structuresOs = {O1, ..., On}
to the model that can be used to evaluate constructs that describe them. Each organiza-
tional structure Oi is a tuple
Oi = (Asi, Ri, reai,≤i, Di, Obji,Ki) (3)
describing the elements of an organization, as follows:
– Asi : W → 2A indicates in each state the set of agents belonging to organization
Oi
– Ri :W → 2
R indicates in each state the set of roles belonging to organization Oi
where R stands for the (finite) set of all possible roles
– reai :W → (Asi ×Ri) indicates in each state which agents play which role(s)
– ≤i :W → (Ri × Ri) defines the dependency relation between roles in an organi-
zation
– Di :W → 2Ψ indicates the desired state of the organization in each world
– Obji : Ri ×W → 2(Ψ\⊤) indicates which role in the organization needs to realize
a certain objective of the organization
– Ki = (K
+
i ,K
−
i ) with:
K+i :W → 2
Ψ indicates the positive “knowledge” of the organization
K−i :W → 2
Ψ indicates the negative “knowledge” of the organization
The function Asi defines the agents that participate in the organization at each point in
time. It determines the workforce and thus also the capabilities available to the organi-
zation.
The function Ri defines the roles of the organization. Although we assume that the set
of roles is more stable than the set of agents participating in the organization, we keep
open the possibility for reorganization by having the set of roles depend on the state.
The function reai relates the agents to the roles they play at each moment in time. Note
that, at any time, agents can play more than one role and roles can be played by more
than one agent.
The relation ≤i indicates the structural dependency between the set of roles of orga-
nization Oi. This relation can be seen as a kind of power relation between the agents
playing the roles in an organization4. Distribution of tasks is done following these de-
pendency structures.≤i is a poset satisfying the following properties:
1. ∀w, ∀r ∈ Ri(w) :≤i (r, r, w) (reflexivity)
2. ∀w, ∀p, r, q ∈ Ri(w) : if ≤i (p, r, w) and ≤i (r, q, w) then ≤i (p, q, w) (transitiv-
ity)
The reflexivity propertymakes sure that each role has power over itself and the transitiv-
ity property makes sure that an agent can distribute tasks to agents that are somewhere
below it in the dependency structure5. Because we also want to be able to talk about
distribution of tasks by an agent to a group of other agents we generalize the depen-
dency relation to groups of roles, as follows:
≤i (r, S, w) iff ∀q ∈ S ⊆ Ri(w) :≤i (r, q, w)
≤i (S, S′, w) iff ∀q ∈ S′, ∃r ∈ S :≤i (r, q, w)
Intuitively, the ordering relation in the set of roles determines the interaction pos-
sibilities between agents playing the roles. Organizational structures influence the way
that agents in the organization can interact. The relation r ≤i q indicates that an agent
playing r is able to interact with an agent playing q in order to request or demand some
result. ≤i (r, S, w) means that agents playing role r can demand a result from agents
playing any of the roles in S. E.g. the CEO of a company can order both the sales man-
ager as well as the production manager to achieve some goal (such as increase number
of products sold). Finally, ≤i (S, S
′, w) means that for an agent i fulfilling a role from
S′ one can find a role in S such that an agent j fulfilling that role can demand a result
from i. E.g. for every person working in a construction company (carpenter, plumber,
etc.) there is a manager that supervises that person. This construction makes it possible
to say that the board of managers is managing the workers, while not every manager can
direct all workers. In this paper, we will not further detail the types of interactions be-
tween agents (delegation, request, bid, ...) but assume that the relationship will achieve
some result, through a more or less complex interaction process. More on this issue can
be found in [13].
The set of domain facts given byDi indicates the state that the organizationOi tries
to achieve. IfM,w |= Di(w) the organization has achieved its objective.
The relation Obji indicates which role is responsible (through the agents playing it)
to initiate actions to achieve a certain objective of the organization (given by a set of
domain facts, which cannot include ⊤). We say that an organization is well-defined iff
4 LAO abstracts from the different types of power that exist in real organizations and furthermore
does not elaborate further the consequences of power in communication between agents. More
on this aspect can be found in [13].
5 In reality, this transitivity is not always automatic, i.e. the chain of command must be followed
to delegate tasks downwards. By this formalization, is meant the final distribution of tasks
resulting from this chain of commands.
Di(w) ⊆
⋃
r∈Ri
Obji(r, w), i.e. for all desired objectives of the organization there is a
role in charge of reaching that objective.
The last relation Ki denotes the “knowledge” of the organization. In this paper, we as-
sume this knowledge to be information that is available to all agents in the organization.
It can be seen as a central database. We mainly introduce this element because we want
to be able to describe situations where agents might have certain capabilities, but this is
not known in the organization and thus a task is not delegated to the right agent. In [13]
we discuss how the structural dependencies in an organization can influence the flow
of information in that organization. As before, we take here the incremental approach,
usingKi as a ‘placeholder’ for more complex treatment of organizational information.
We also explicitly do not model this operator as a traditional modal epistemic relation
which would require a thorough discussion of all possible connections between this
modal operator and the action related operators. This is also left for future research.
We do, however, distinguish K+i and K
−
i in order to be able to distinguish between
the fact that something is known to be true, known to be false or not known. We also
require that K+i (w) ⊂ w which means that all facts that are known are also true and
K−i (w) ∩ w = ∅ which means that things that are known to be false do not hold in the
world.
Given the above organizational concepts, we can now extend the languageLO . First
we introduce some predicates that describe various organizational relations.
Definition 6. Given an organization Oi = (Ai, Ri, reai,≤i, Di, Obji,Ki), the orga-
nization language LO introduced in Definition 3, is extended to include the following
predicates, where a ∈ Ai,r, q ∈ Ri and
varphi ∈ LO:
member(a,Oi) ∈ LO ,
role(r,Oi) ∈ LO ,
play(a, r, Oi) ∈ LO ,
dep(Oi, r, q) ∈ LO ,
know(Oi, ϕ) ∈ LO ,
incharge(Oi, r, ϕ) ∈ LO with ϕ not containing negations,
desire(Oi, ϕ) ∈ LO with ϕ not containing negations
with the following semantics:
MO, w |= member(a,Oi) iff a ∈ Asi(w),
MO, w |= role(r,Oi) iff r ∈ Ri(w),
MO, w |= play(a, r, Oi) iff reai(w, a, r),
MO, w |= dep(Oi, r, q) iff r ≤i (w)q,
MO, w |= know(Oi, p) iff pi(p) ∈ K
+
i (w) for p ∈ Φ,
MO, w |= know(Oi,¬p) iff pi(p) ∈ K
−
i (w) for p ∈ Φ,
MO, w |= know(Oi, ϕ ∧ ψ) iffMO, w |= know(Oi, ϕ) and
MO, w |= know(Oi, ψ),
MO, w |= incharge(Oi, r, p) iff pi(p) ∈ Obji(r, w) for p ∈ Φ,
MO, w |= desire(Oi, p) iff pi(p) ∈ Di(w) for p ∈ Φ,
MO, w |= incharge(Oi, r, ϕ ∧ ψ) iffMO, w |= incharge(Oi, r, φ) and
MO, w |= incharge(Oi, r, ψ)
MO, w |= desire(Oi, ϕ ∧ ψ) iffMO, w |= desire(Oi, ϕ) and
MO, w |= desire(Oi, ψ)
We do not allow negations within the scope of incharge and desire in order to keep the
semantics of these concepts relatively simple. 6 In most practical cases it also appears
sufficient to model all that we want as most desires and objectives are formulated as
positive facts that are to be established. The same facts can be defined for groups of
roles. In particular, given an organization structure and the definition of the dependency
relation between roles we can also define a similar relation of dependency on a group
of roles as follows:
Definition 7 (Group Dependency). For Oi = (Asi, Ri, reai,≤i, Di, Obji,Ki), and
group of roles U ⊆ Ri, dep(Oi,r,U) is defined as
dep(Oi, r, Z) ≡ ∀q ∈ Z : dep(Oi, r, q).
Besides the above extensions we also want to extend the language with organiza-
tional actions, i.e, the actions performed by agents playing a role in the organization.
Definition 8. The organization language LO in Definition 6, is extended, for orga-
nization Oi = (Asi, Ri, reai,≤i, Di, Obji,Ki), to include the following predicates.
∀a ∈ A, ∀r ∈ R, and ∀ϕ ∈ LO:
Carϕ ∈ LO ,
Garϕ ∈ LO ,
Harϕ ∈ LO ,
ICar ∈ LO ,
Earϕ ∈ LO
Where e.g.Carϕ stands for the fact that ϕ is part of the capabilities of the role r enacted
by agent a. In order to be able to give semantics to these types of actions we will change
the semantic model with respect to actions slightly. Mainly we couple the agent labels
in the model to roles. A restriction is that agents can only be coupled to roles they are
6 If we would allow negations we could e.g. not use simple sets of desires to define the semantics,
because this does not provide a means to express a difference between desire(Oi,¬p) and
¬desire(Oi, p).
playing. We assume that everything an agent does is done in its capacity of enactor of a
certain role. So, agents do not act without having a role attached to it. We can still talk
about an agent performing an action if the role is not important. This is made possible
through the second clause in definition 9. We could also facilitate this by having a
special role (something like ”agent”) which has no necessary capabilities and can be
played by any agent in any state and denotes that the agent is not acting as playing an
organizational role. We do not pursue this further in this paper, because we are mainly
interested in agents functioning completely within the organizational setting.
Within MO we change the relation T such that it relates tuples of agents and roles
to transitions and the capabilities are now also defined for roles and tuples of agents
playing roles:
– c : A×W → 2Ψ associates agents with facts in Ψ , i.e. c(a) indicates the capabilities
of a
– cn : R × W → 2Ψ associates roles with facts in Ψ , indicating the necessary
capabilites that an agent should have to play role r.
– cr : A × R ×W → 2Ψ is a function that associates tuples (agent,role) in a world
w with the facts in Ψ
– T : Rt→ 2A×R is the set of (agent,role) labels on elements of Rt,
The function cn restricts the relation reai such that reai(w, a, r) can only hold if
cn(r, w) ⊆ c(a, w). I.e. an agent a can only play a role r if it has the necessary ca-
pabilities to play that role. Furthermore, cr(a, r, w) is only defined iff reai(w, a, r).
We assume that agents can get extra capabilities when playing roles and thus that
c(a, w) ⊆ cr(a, r, w). The set Σar is defined inductively over cr in the same way
as Σa was defined over c.
Roles only appear in the transition influence relation when played by an agent: (a, r)
can only be an element of T ((w,w′)) iff reai(w, a, r) holds.
We also redefine the notion of transition influence as follows:
Definition 9 (Transition influence). Given a model MO = (Ψ,A,W,Rt, T, pi, c), a
world w ∈ W and an agent a ∈ A, role r ∈ R such that reai(a, r, w), the transition
influence of (a, r) in w, Tarw and Taw are defined by:
Tarw = {rt|rt ∈ Rt : ∃w′ : rt = (w,w′) and (a, r) ∈ T (rt)}
Taw = {rt|rt ∈ Rt : ∃w′ : rt = (w,w′) and ∃r ∈ R: (a, r) ∈ T (rt)}
Given the definitions above we can keep all the definitions on agent capability, ability,
attempt and activity. But we now have additional definitions for agents playing roles.
Definition 10 (Role enacting Agent Capability, Ability, Attempt, Control and Ac-
tivity). Given agent a ∈ A,r ∈ R, role enacting agent capability, Carϕ, role enacting
agent ability, Garϕ, role enacting agent attempt, Harϕ, role enacting agent control,
ICar, and role enacting agent activity, Earϕ, are defined as:
Car: w |= Carϕ iff ∃w′ 6 w : w′ |= ¬ϕ and ∃ψ ∈ Σar such that |= ψ → ϕ
Gar: w |= Garϕ iff w |= Carϕ and ∃(w,w′) ∈ Tarw : w′ |= ϕ
Har: w |= Harϕ iff w |= Garϕ and ∀(w,w′) ∈ Tarw : w′ |= ϕ
ICar: w |= ICar iff ∀w′ : (w,w′) ∈ Rt⇒ (w,w′) ∈ Tarw
Ear: w |= Earϕ iff w |= Harϕ ∧ ICar
A few comments are due concerning the above definitions. For the purpose of this pa-
per, we see agents as actors of roles in a organization, that is, the agent’s objectives are
those of the roles they enact. We assume that, by acting according to their capabilities,
agents work towards organizational objectives. We assume that agents have their own
internal motivations to enact a role [7], but that motivation is not discussed further in
this paper. In fact, the notion of agent in LAO is that of role-enacting agent as described
in [11]. Furthermore, organizational knowledge is treated, for the moment, as a label
marking facts that are explicitly known by the organization. That is, we do not pro-
vide epistemic capabilities in order to reason about knowledge, rather than asserting
the fact that something is known. Future extensions to LAO will improve these initial
assumptions.
Like with actions of agents we can extend the above definitions to groups of role
enacting agents:
Definition 11 (Groups of Role enacting Agents Capability, Ability, Attempt, Con-
trol and Activity).Given a set of agents V ⊆ A and a set of rolesU ⊆ R, role enacting
agent capability, Carϕ, role enacting agent ability, Garϕ, role enacting agent attempt,
Harϕ, role enacting agent control, ICar, and role enacting agent activity, Earϕ, are
defined as:
CV U : w |= CV Uϕ iff ∃w′ |= ¬ϕ and ∃a ∈ V ∃r ∈ U ∃ψ ∈ Σar such
that w |= ψ → ϕ
GV U : w |= GV Uϕ iff w |= CV Uϕ and ∃a ∈ V ∃r ∈ U ∃(w,w′) ∈
Tarw : w
′ |= ϕ
HV U : w |= HV Uϕ iff w |= GV Uϕ and ∀a ∈ V ∀r ∈ U if reai(w, a, r)
then ∀(w,w′) ∈ Tarw : w′ |= ϕ
ICV U : w |= ICV U iff ∀w′ : (w,w′) ∈ Rt ⇒ (∃a ∈ V ∃r ∈ U :
reai(w, a, r) and (w,w
′) ∈ Tarw)
EV U : w |= EV Uϕ iff w |= HV Uϕ ∧ ICV U
4.1 Organization Capability
Based on the definitions given in the previous sections, we now define organization
capability (or scope of control). In fact, an organization is only as good as its agents.
An organization is said to be capable of achieving ϕ if there is a subset of agents in that
organization that has the capability to achieve ϕ. Of course, whether an organization
actually is able to achieveϕ also depends on whether the task of achieving this objective
arrives at the agents that are capable of achieving it. We will treat that aspect later on.
Formally the capability of an organization is defined as follows:
Definition 12 (Organization Capability). Given a model MO, a world w ∈ W and
organizationOi organizational capability COi is defined as:
MO, w |= COϕ iff ∃Z ⊆ Asi(w) :MO, w |= CZϕ
4.2 Responsibility and Initiative
To further refine the concept of organization, we need to be able to describe and reason
about the responsibilities that are linked to the roles within the organization. Responsi-
bilities within an organization enable agents to make decisions about what each mem-
ber of the organization is expected to do, according to the organization specification,
and to anticipate the tasks of others [26]. Informally, by responsibility we mean that
an agent or group has to make sure that a certain state of affairs is achieved, either by
realizing it itself or by delegating that result to someone else. Extensive work on respon-
sibility has been done, amongst others, by Jones and Sergot [32] and by Castelfranchi
[5], which provides a richer description of the concepts of responsibility and power. In
line with our aim to provide a comprehensive but minimal formal framework to reason
about organization and change, in the remainder of this section we focus on the issue
of initiative taking as part of responsibility. I.e. we concentrate on the case that, if the
organization has defined the responsibilities of to include some activity, agents playing
that role have to initiate some action towards that activity. They cannot wait until they
are asked by others to perform some task. On the other hand, the organization assumes
that the agents playing the role will eventually do something about the activity that the
role is responsible for7.
We introduce the operator incharge to represent the case that a certain role is in charge
(has the initiative) of accomplishing a certain state. In order to describe this notion
of initiative from the role perspective, we introduce a new operator, Ir, such that Irϕ
means that r has the initiative to achieve ϕ, which means that an agent playing r should
perform some action to achieve ϕ. The initiative operator is also defined for a group Z
of roles, IZ , in a similar way.
Definition 13. Formally, we extend the language LO as follows:
r ∈ R,ϕ ∈ LO ⇒ Irϕ ∈ LO
Z ⊆ R,ϕ ∈ LO ⇒ IZϕ ∈ LO
Before we give a semantic definition of Initiative we first show how initiative is related
to incharge(Oi, r, ϕ) previously defined facts:
|= incharge(Oi, r, ϕ)→ Irϕ (4)
The validity expresses that if a role defined by the organization to be responsible to
achieve ϕ it will automatically take the initiative to act such that ϕ will be achieved.
Because roles do not act themselves, this means that an agent playing the role r will act
in order to achieve ϕ. In a richer model this would of course also involve the decision
process of the agent(s), including forming the decision of delegating or performing ϕ
itself. In that case, the definition below would be extended by a weaker version that
states that if the role is in charge of ϕ than an agent enacting that role is obliged to take
initiative to achieve ϕ. This normative aspect of the responsibility is quite important,
but also very complex in combination with delegations in organizations. See e.g. [9,10]
for more details on this matter. Again, we leave the combination of that theory with the
organizational framework for future work.
Note that when an agent will take initiative to achieve a state of affairs this does
not guarantee successful achievement of that state of affairs. In fact, initiative can be
defined informallu as: role r has initiative to achieve ϕ iff an agent a playing r will
7 In this paper, we don’t develop further on the issue of eventual action.
eventually attempt to achieve ϕ or attempt to put another role in charge of ϕ. Formally
initiative is defined in terms of attempt, as follows:
Definition 14 (Initiative).Given modelMO and organizationOi,Oi = (Asi, Ri, reai,≤i
, Di, Obji,Ki), initiative Irϕ, resp. IZϕ, for role r ∈ Ri(w), resp. group Z ⊆ Ri(w),
is defined as:
w |= Irϕ iff w |= ∃a : play(a, r, Oi) ∧ ♦(Harϕ ∨Harincharge(Oi, q, ϕ)),
for some q ∈ Ri(w)
w |= IZϕ iff ∃U ⊆ Asi(w)∀a ∈ U∃r ∈ Z : w |= play(a, r, Oi) ∧
♦(HUZϕ ∨HUZ incharge(Oi, Z
′, ϕ)), for some Z ′ ⊆ Ri(w)
Note that the above definition requires that if a role has the initiative to achieve a certain
state ϕ there also is at least one agent playing that role (which can then try to achieveϕ).
From this agent it is required that eventually it attempts to achieveϕ or that it attempts to
put another role in charge of achieving ϕ. Whether the agent can attempt to ”delegate”
an initiative to another role depends on the relations there exists between the roles.
In the next section we will define the notion of delegation that indicates when such
an attempt is certainly possible. Different properties can be defined for the initiative
operator, which identify different types of organizations. For example, a well-defined
organization is one where there is someone in charge for each of the organizational
objectives.
Definition 15 (Well-Defined Organization). Given an organization Oi in a model
MO, Oi = (Asi, Ri, reai,≤i, Di, Obji,Ki), we say that Oi is a well-defined orga-
nization if it satisfies the following requirement:
MO, w |= desire(Oi, ϕ)→ ∃r : (role(r,Oi) ∧ Irϕ) (5)
We call an organization successful if the organization also has the capabilities to achieve
each objective. Formally,
Definition 16 (Successful Organization). Given an organization Oi in a modelMO,
Oi = (Asi, Ri, reai,≤i, Di, Obji,Ki), we say that Oi is a successful organization if
it satisfies the following requirement:
MO, w |= desire(Oi, ϕ)→ COiϕ ∧ ∃r : (role(r,Oi) ∧ Irϕ) (6)
Note that, due to the definition of Ir, this definition of success is dependent on the
specific agents that play the roles in the organization.
4.3 Delegation
Delegation of tasks is defined as the capability to put an agent, or group, in charge for
that task (through the roles they play). In an organization, the power of delegation is
associated with structural dependencies. That is, by nature of their dependencies, some
agents are capable of delegating their tasks to other agents, through the respective roles
they play in the organization. Formally,
Definition 17 (Power of delegation).Given an organizationOi in a modelMO, Oi =
(Asi, Ri, reai,≤i, Di, Obji,Ki), the power of delegation forϕ between two roles r, q ∈
Ri(w) is defined as the following constraint in the model:
ifMO, w |= dep(Oi, r, q) ∧ incharge(Oi, r, ϕ) ∧ play(a, r, Oi)
thenMO, w |= Carincharge(Oi, q, ϕ)
Given the notions of initiative and structural dependency introduced above, we can
define a good organization as follows:
Definition 18 (Good Organization). Given an organizationOi in a modelMO, Oi =
(Asi, Ri, reai,≤i, Di, Obji,Ki), we say that Oi is a good organization if it satisfies
the following requirement:
if w |= (COiϕ ∧ IZϕ) then
(∃U ⊆ Ri(w) and V = {a‖reai(w, a, r), r ∈ U} and w |= dep(Oi, Z, U) ∧CV Uϕ)
where Z,U ⊆ Ri(w) represent a group of roles in Oi and V is defined as the set of
agents playing one of the roles of the set U .
That is, a good organization is an organization such that if the organization has the
capability to achieve ϕ and there is a group of roles in the organization responsible for
realizing it, then the roles being in charge have a chain of delegation to roles that are
played by agents in Asi that are actually capable of achieving it. Note that it is possible
that Z = U . Good organizations satisfy the following property:
Irϕ→ ♦HOiϕ (7)
which informally says that if there is a role in charge of a given state of affairs, then
eventually the state will be attempted (of course, the success of such attempt is depen-
dent on possible external interferences). This follows immediately from the previous
definition. We define an efficient organization as:
Definition 19 (Efficient Organization). Given an organization Oi in a model MO,
Oi = (Asi, Ri, reai,≤i, Di, Obji,Ki), we say that Oi is a efficient organization if it
satisfies the following requirement:
MO, w |= (Irϕ ∧ (∀a ∈ Ai : play(a, r, Oi) → ¬Carϕ) ∧ (∃q ∈ Ri :
dep(Oi, r, q)) ∧ (∃b ∈ Ai : play(b, q, Oi)) ∧ know(Oi, Cbqϕ)) →
Earincharge(Oi, q, ϕ)
This states that if a role r is in charge to achieve ϕ but none of the agents playing role
r is capable, but it is known that an agent b playing role q does have the capability to
achieve ϕ and also q is a subordinate role of r then some agent a playing role r will
delegate the responsibility to role q. Thus a hands responsibility of tasks to those agents
of which it is known that they can achieve them (if it cannot achieve them itself).
4.4 Supervision
Related to the notion of a good organization is the idea that agents should supervise
each other’s work. I.e. if role r is in charge that agent b attempts to achieve a certain
objective then role r becomes responsible for that objective again if b fails in his attempt.
For instance, when a project leader delegates the task of implementing a module of
the system to a certain person and that person fails to implement the module (maybe
because he becomes ill) then the project leader should take back the task and give it
to someone else (or do it himself). Note that we talk about the project leader being a
role in the organization. In principle it does not matter which person plays that role of
project leader. The person always has to act when the programmer fails. We can define
this property as follows:
Definition 20 (Supervising Duty). Given an organization Oi in a model MO, Oi =
(Asi, Ri, reai,≤i, Di, Obji,Ki), and group of rolesZ ⊆ Ri(w), and a group of agents
V ⊆ Asi(w) playing the roles U ⊆ Ri(w), the supervising duty of roles Z with respect
to the group agents V to realize ϕ is defined as:
SD(Z,V )ϕ ≡ (IZHV Uϕ ∧ ♦(HV Uϕ ∧X¬ϕ))→ IZϕ).
The definition states that if V attempts to realize ϕ with a certain degree of uncertainty
while under the responsibility of Z , then roles Z becomes directly in charge of achiev-
ing ϕ every time V fails to realize ϕ.
5 On the axiomatization of LAO
In the previous sections we have introduced both syntax and semantics of LAO. In
order to provide a logical characterization of LAO, in this section we discuss an axiom-
atization of LAO and give a number of theorems. The soundness of the axioms follows
directly from the definitions and thus we abstain from giving formal proofs, and only
indicate proof sketches where necessary. We also do not pretend that the given axiom
system is complete, which would require a separate paper due to the intricate relations
between the modal operators introduced.
Moreover, we give most axioms on the operators applied to single agents. These ax-
ioms can also be formulated for groups of agents. We leave these out as they would just
duplicate all axioms without adding any new intuition.
We give the axioms in sets that are related to the same intuition. The first important
intuition is that we do not want agents to have capabilities to achieve tautologies. I.e.
achievements should be related to state of affairs whose truth value can be influenced
and thus can be either true or false. This leads to the following axioms.
Axioms
(A1) ¬Ca⊤
(A2) ¬Car⊤
(A3) ¬incharge(Oi, r,⊤)
The soundness of follows directly from the definitions. The other achievement operators
are defined over the capability operator and thus they “inherit” the property directly.
This can be seen after we presented the axioms relating the operators a bit further below.
Given these axioms the next question obviously is whether the achievement modal-
ities are “normal” modalities in the sense that the K axiom holds. Having the K axiom
allows to at least combine achievements or attempts in order to reason about the com-
binations. Fortunately we still have that for most of them:
Axioms
(A4) Caϕ ∧ Caψ → Ca(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(A4r) Carϕ ∧ Carψ → Car(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(A5) Haϕ ∧Haψ → Ha(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(A5r) Harϕ ∧Harψ → Har(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(A6) Irϕ ∧ Irψ → Ir(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(A7) incharge(Oi, r, ϕ) ∧ incharge(Oi, r, ψ)→ incharge(Oi, r, ϕ ∧ ψ)
(A8) desire(Oi, ϕ) ∧ desire(Oi, ψ)→ desire(Oi, ϕ ∧ ψ)
We also have K axiom property for Ea and Ear, however because these are defined in
terms ofHa and ICa andHar and ICar, these properties are given as theorems:
Theorems
(T1) ⊢ Eaϕ ∧ Eaψ → Ea(ϕ ∧ ψ)
(T2) ⊢ Earϕ ∧ Earψ → Ear(ϕ ∧ ψ)
Only for abilities this works the other way (due to the existential quantifier in the defi-
nition of its semantics):
Axioms
(A9) Ga(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ Gaϕ ∧Gaψ
(A9r) Gar(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ Garϕ ∧Garψ
There are some ways in which achievements of agents and achievements of role enact-
ing agents can be related. First note that the capabilities of an agent should include the
capabilities necessary to play a role, but that an agent enacting a role can have more
capabilities than an agent not enacting a role. Thus:
Axioms
(A10) ∀r, a, Oi : (play(a, r, Oi) ∧Crϕ)→ Caϕ
(A11) ∀r, a, Oi : (play(a, r, Oi) ∧Caϕ)→ Carϕ
The other achievement operators of agents and role enacting agents are related as fol-
lows:
Axioms
(A12) Caϕ ∧Garϕ→ Gaϕ
(A13) ∀r, a, Oi : (play(a, r, Oi) ∧Haϕ)→ Harϕ
(A14) ICar → ICa
Because role enacting agents can have more capabilities axiom (A12) only holds be-
cause we require Caϕ. Note that we also do not have Gaϕ → Garϕ, because a might
have influence on some transition enacting another role but no influence on any transi-
tion while enacting role r.
Axiom (A13) follows from the fact that Tarw ⊆ Taw and thus if something holds over
all transitions in Taw it also holds for all subsets of transitions and in particular for Tarw
for any r that is enacted by a. Axiom (14) follows from the same fact.
From the above axiom we can easily see that the following theorem is true:
Theorems
(T3) ⊢ (ICarϕ ∧Harϕ)→ Haϕ
So, if a role r enacting agent a is in control and attempting to achieve ϕ then a is also
attempting to achieve ϕ (because there are no transitions in which a has influence and
in which he is not enacting r, due to the fact that ICar).
We can now also prove a property similar to the above axioms to relate Ea and Ear:
Theorems
(T4) ⊢ Caϕ ∧ Earϕ→ Eaϕ
The proof follows easily from axioms (A12), (A14) and the theorem above. We do not
have the T axiom for any of these modalities. The only axiom that resembles the T
axiom is stating that if an agent (enacting a role) sees to it that ϕ this will be true in the
next state:
Axioms
(A15) Eaϕ→ Xϕ
(A15r) Earϕ→ Xϕ
From this axiom it is also right away clear that we don’t have the usual theorem that
follows from the T axiom:
EaEaϕ 6→ Eaϕ
The antecedent translates to: a sees to it that (in the next state) it will see to it that ϕ.
So, then ϕ will be realized only in two time steps from the current state. The conse-
quent requires ϕ to be achieved in the next time step already. So, the fact that in our
framework the achievement takes time prevents this theorem to be true and unnesting
of achievement operators is not possible. We do have the T axiom (and the K axiom)
for the know relation:
Axioms
(A16) know(Oi, ϕ)→ ϕ
(A17) know(Oi, ϕ) ∧ know(Oi, ψ)→ know(Oi, ϕ ∧ ψ)
We do not have the usual axioms 4 and 5, because we do not allow nesting of the know
operator.
Finally, we do have the D axiom (and the K axiom) for organizational desires:
Axioms
(A18) ¬desire(Oi,⊥)
(A19) desire(Oi, ϕ) ∧ desire(Oi, ψ)→ desire(Oi, ϕ ∧ ψ)
There are a number of axioms that relate the different achievement operators for agents
and also similar ones relating role enacting agent achievement operators:
Axioms
(A20) Gaϕ→ Caϕ
(A20r) Garϕ→ Carϕ
(A21) Haϕ→ Caϕ
(A21r) Harϕ→ Carϕ
(A22) Haϕ→ Gaϕ
(A22r) Harϕ→ Garϕ
(A23) Earϕ→ Irϕ
(A24) Harϕ→ Irϕ
(A25) incharge(Oi, r, ϕ)→ Irϕ
Axioms (A20-A22) are standard and follow directly from the definitions of the seman-
tics of the operators. Axioms (A23) and (A24) are maybe less obvious. They state that
role enacting agents only attempt or see to it that a state ϕ becomes true if the role
they are playing has the initiative to attempt or achieve that state. This means that role
enacting agents only perform actions that are supporting the objectives of the roles they
enact. This does not mean that agents cannot perform any other actions, but, that in
their role enacting capacity they are limited to perform actions for which the role has
the initiative. This property gives some handles to make some statements about an orga-
nization based on its desires and the objectives of the roles abstracting away fromwhich
precise agents fulfill the roles. Given these axioms we can easily prove the following
theorems:
Theorems
(T5) ⊢ ¬Ir⊤
(T6) ⊢ ¬Ga⊤
(T7) ⊢ ¬Gar⊤
(T8) ⊢ ¬Ha⊤
(T9) ⊢ ¬Har⊤
(T10) ⊢ ¬Ea⊤
(T11) ⊢ ¬Ear⊤
(T12) ⊢ Eaϕ→ Caϕ
(T13) ⊢ Earϕ→ Carϕ
(T14) ⊢ Eaϕ→ Haϕ
(T15) ⊢ Earϕ→ Harϕ
The first seven follow from the relation between G,H and E to C and the fact that we
have ¬Ca⊤ (A1). The last four follow directly from the definition of E.
The following theorems relate potential achievements of different agents at the same
time:
Theorems
(T16) ⊢ Eaϕ→ ∀b : ¬Gb¬ϕ
(T17) ⊢ Earϕ→ ∀b : ¬Gb¬ϕ
(T18) ⊢ Earϕ→ ∀q : ∀b : ¬Gbq¬ϕ
Again the proof is direct from the definition of the E operator. Given that agent a
(possibly enacting a role r) sees to it that ϕ is achieved means that a is in control. If a
is in control and attempts to achieve ϕ then in all states following the current one holds
ϕ. As a consequence there is not one following state where ¬ϕ can hold and thus it is
not possible for any other agent to have the ability to achieve ¬ϕ in the current state.
Given the above theorems the following theorems are obvious from the definitions of
the operators as well:
Theorems
(T19) ⊢ Eaϕ→ ¬Eb¬ϕ
(T20) ⊢ Earϕ→ ∀b : ¬Eb¬ϕ
(T21) ⊢ Earϕ→ ∀q : ∀b : ¬Ebq¬ϕ
(T22) ⊢ Eaϕ→ ¬Hb¬ϕ
(T23) ⊢ Earϕ→ ∀b : ¬Hb¬ϕ
(T24) ⊢ Earϕ→ ∀q : ∀b : ¬Hbq¬ϕ
Only when an agent sees to it that ϕ becomes true it is not possible for another agent to
try to achieve its negation. Note that, the following theorems that could be expected as
in other theories do not hold here:
6⊢ Haϕ→ ¬Hb¬ϕ
6⊢ Harϕ→ ∀b : ¬Hb¬ϕ
6⊢ Harϕ→ ∀q : ∀b : ¬Hbq¬ϕ
which would indicate the impossibility of parallel attempts to achieveϕ and its negation
by different agents (possibly enacting roles)! Finally, we add the following two axioms
relating agents to organizations:
Axioms
(A26) member(a,Oi) ∧ Caϕ→ COiϕ
(A27) incharge(Oi, r, ϕ)∧dep(Oi, r, q)→ ∃a : play(a, r, Oi)∧Caincharge(Oi, q, ϕ)
We do not have the necessitation rules for the operators but we do have the following
rules of inference:
Rules of inference
(R1) If |= ϕ↔ ψ then |= Caϕ↔ Caψ
(R2) If |= ϕ↔ ψ then |= Carϕ↔ Carψ
(R3) If |= ϕ↔ ψ then |= Gaϕ↔ Gaψ
(R4) If |= ϕ↔ ψ then |= Garϕ↔ Garψ
(R5) If |= ϕ↔ ψ then |= Haϕ↔ Haψ
(R6) If |= ϕ↔ ψ then |= Harϕ↔ Harψ
(R7) If |= ϕ↔ ψ then |= Eaϕ↔ Eaψ
(R8) If |= ϕ↔ ψ then |= Earϕ↔ Earψ
(R9) If |= ϕ↔ ψ then |= Irϕ↔ Irψ
With these rules we conclude the sketch of an axiomatization for the LAO framework.
As said before, we do not attempt to give a complete study of the LAO framework
as a logic, which we leave for a separate paper. Rather we will now continue to show
how the framework can function as a basis to specify organizational change (through
operators that change the organization from one state to another) and how this helps to
specify and analyze different use cases in a uniform way.
6 Application of LAO
So far, we have introduced a formal model to represent organizations. Our claim is that
such models enable the analysis and modelling of organizations in a formal and real-
istic way, and are as such more qualified for organization representation than (classic)
logics. In this section, we will further discuss this claim by using the model to analyze
abstract organization types and by applying it to the case study introduced in section
2.2. LAO has also been applied to formally describe other existing agent systems, such
as Adaptive Architectures for Command and Control (described in [14]), RoboSoccer
(described in [15]), and crisis management (described in [39]). Furthermore, LAO is
used as the formal basis for the OperettA tool for design and analysis of organization
models [12]. Together, this provides a basis to demonstrate the power of LAO to model
and analyze different types of organizations and study organizational changes.
6.1 Types of Organizations
The work of Mintzberg on the analysis of organizational structures [36] is widely used
within Organization Theory. According to Mintzberg, environmental variety is deter-
mined by both environmental complexity and the pace of change. Inspired by and ex-
tending the work of Mintzberg, researchers in Organizational Theory have proposed a
growing number of classifications for organization structures, e.g. simple, bureaucracy,
matrix, virtual enterprize, network, boundary-less organizations, conglomeration, al-
liance, etc. just to name a few forms. However, definitions and naming of organizational
forms are often unclear and the classification of a specific organization into one of the
proposed classes is not trivial, often resulting in hybrid forms.
Based on the structure of control, Burns and Stalker distinguish two main types of
organization structures: hierarchies and networks [3]. Using the formal definition of
organization presented in the previous sections, we are able to specify the structural
characteristics of these two types of organizations.
In a hierarchy, organizational objectives are known to the managers who delegate
them to their subordinates who have the capabilities and resources to realize them.
Formally,
Definition 21. (Hierarchy)
A structured organizationOi = (Asi, Ri, reai,≤i, Di, Obji,Ki) is said to be an hier-
archy iff ∀w ∈ W :
∃M ⊂ Ri,M 6= ⊘ : ∀m ∈M, ∃ϕ ∈ Di : ϕ ∈ Obji(m,w)∧
∀ϕ ∈ Di, ∃m ∈M : ϕ ∈ Obji(m,w), and
∀r ∈ Ri, r 6∈M, ∃m ∈M :≤i (m, r, w)
That is, there is a group of managers M that together is responsible for all organiza-
tional objectives and have a chain of command to all other agents in the organization.
In a simple, flat, hierarchy, the manager group furthermoremeets the following require-
ments:
M = {m} and ∀r ∈ Ri :≤i (m, r, w) and 6 ∃s ∈ Ri, s 6= m :≤i (s, r, w).
In the same way, we formally define a network organization as:
Definition 22. (Network)
A structured organization Oi = (Asi, Ri, reai,≤i, Di, Obji,Ki) is said to be a net-
work iff ∀w ∈W :
∀r ∈ Ri : Obji(r, w) ∩Di 6= ⊘ and ∀ϕ ∈ Di : ∃r ∈ Ri : ϕ ∈ Obji(r, w)
∀r ∈ Ri, ∃s ∈ Ri :≤i (r, s, w)
That is, every agent in the organization is responsible for some of the organizational
objectives, and have a delegation relationship to some other agent in the organization.
A fully connected network also meets the following requirement:
∀r, s ∈ Ri :≤i (r, s, w).
A team is also a special case of network that meets the symmetry requirement:
≤i (r, s, w)→≤i (s, r, w).
6.2 Case study
We have applied LAO to formally describe the gas market organization introduced in
section 2.2. The situation before liberalization is described by:
O0gas = (As
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gas), where
– As0gas = {m, t, s, l} are the agents, with capabilities
Ctbuy-gas, Cstransport-gas, Cllocal-flow
– ROgas = {monopolist, trader, shipper, local-transport} are the roles
– rea0gas = {(m,monopolist), (t, trader), (s, shipper), (l, local-transport)} are the
initial role enacting agent relations
– ≤0gas= {monopolist ≤gas trader,monopolist ≤gas shipper,monopolist ≤gas local-transport}
specifies the control of monopolist roles over the other partners in the supply chain
– D0gas = {provide-gas}
– Obj0gas(monopolist) = {provide-gas}
– Obj0gas(trader) = {buy-gas}
– Obj0gas(shipper) = {transport-gas}
– Obj0gas(local-transport) = {local-transport}
– K0gas = {know(Ogas, provide-gas← (buy-gas ∧ transport-gas∧ local-flow)} are
the known means to achieve the objective of providing gas.
It is straightforward to see that this organization is in a state in which it can realize
its objective of providing gas. In fact, according to definition 15, this is a well-defined
organization, since there is a role that has the objective of realizing the desires of the
organization. Formally:
desire(Ogas, provide-gas) (from Ogas)
incharge(monopolist, provide-gas) (from Ogas)
incharge(monopolist, provide-gas)→ Imonopolistprovide-gas (from (4))
∴ Imonopolistprovide-gas
∴ desire(Ogas, provide-gas)→ Imonopolistprovide-gas
∴ desire(Ogas, provide-gas)→ ∃r : role(r,Ogas) ∧ Irprovide-gas
In the same way can be checked that Ogas is a successful organization (definition 16)
since all capabilities needed to achieve the desire of Ogas(provide-gas) are available
and there is a role that has the initiative to achieve the desire:
Ctbuy-gas∧ Cstransport-gas∧ Cllocal-flow (fromOgas)
∴ COgasprovide-gas (def. 12 and def. of CZ )
Imonopolistprovide-gas (from above)
∴ desire(Ogas, provide-gas)→
COgasprovide-gas∧ ∃r : role(r,Ogas) ∧ Irprovide-gas
The proof that Ogas is also a good organization (definition 18) follows directly
from the fact that the monopolist has delegation power over the agents that have the
capabilities to realize the organization’s objectives.
However, as in all monopolies, the process is fully determined and controlled by the
monopolist and dependent on him. Following the political decision on the liberalization
of the gas market in the Netherlands, the role of the monopolist disappears. This means
that, unless other changes are made, the organization as described above is no longer in
state of achieving its objectives. This is due to the fact that delegation power relations
no longer exist and furthermore no agent is responsible for the organizational objective
DO. Typically, such situation will demand extra capabilities from the parties involved
in order to coordinate their activities without control by the monopolist. A possible
solution is to evolve into a network organization, which provides the flexibility needed
to deal with this situation. create the possibility for the other partners to directly contract
each others and for multiple parties to enter the market. The resulting situation can be
described as follows:
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gas), where:
– As0
′
gas = {t, s, l} are the agents, with capabilities as above
– R0
′
gas = {trader, shipper, local-transport} are the roles
– rea0
′
gas = {(t, trader), (s, shipper), (l, local-transport)} are the initial role enacting
agent relations
– ≤0
′
gas= {trader ≤
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gas shipper} specify the role dependencies
– D0
′
gas = {provide-gas}
– Obj0
′
gas(trader) = {buy-gas, provide-gas}
– Obj0
′
gas(shipper) = {transport-gas, provide-gas}
– Obj0
′
gas(local-transport) = {local-transport, provide-gas}
– K0
′
gas = {know(Ogas, provide-gas← (buy-gas ∧ transport-gas∧ local-flow)} are
the known means to achieve the objective of providing gas.
That is, the monopolist is removed, the roles of trader, shipper and local transport are
extended to take the desire of the organization, provide-gas, as their objective, and de-
pendencies between all roles are created such that a peer network relation is achieved.
These network relations enable the parties to negotiate service contracts between them-
selves. Each of the role enacting agents will be in a state of engaging the others such
that they can achieve provide-gas, as for example in the following sequence of states:
s1a : incharge(Ogas, trader, provide-gas) (from Ogas)
s1b : Itrader(buy-gas∧ transport-gas∧ local-flow) (from Ogas)
s1c : C(t,trader)(incharge(Ogas, shipper, transport-gas) ∧
C(t,trader)(incharge(Ogas, local-tranport, local-flow)
(from Ogas and in-
charge def.)
s2: E(t,trader)incharge(Ogas, shipper, transport-gas) (for some s2 > s1)
s3: E(t,trader)incharge(Ogas, local-tranport, local-flow) (for some s3 > s1)
s4a : Itraderbuy-gas∧ C(t,trader)buy-gas (properties of E and
incharge)
s4b : Ishippertransport-gas ∧C(s,shipper)transport-gas (properties of E and
incharge)
s4c : Ilocal-tranportlocal-flow∧ C(l,local-tranport)local-flow (properties of E and
incharge)
s5: H(t,trader)buy-gas (for some s5 > s4)
s6: H(s,shipper)transport-gas (for some s6 > s4)
s7: H(l,local-tranport)local-flow (for some s7 > s4)
s8: (buy-gas ∧ transport-gas∧ local-flow)
∴ provide-gas
Note thatO′gas does not have knowledge of the capabilities of the agents, and there-
fore does not comply with the notion of efficient organization as in definition 19. In
the above example of an operation, we do assume that knowledge of the capabilities of
role enacting agents is available, and as such the trader passes the initiative for parts
of the operation to the ‘correct’ agents right away. This is merely to illustrate the op-
eration. Without this knowledge the organization would probably end up trying to put
roles in charge of states of affairs for which the agents playing them would not have
the capabilities. Only by an exhaustive trial and error the right distribution of initiatives
would be found. We furthermore left out of the example the fact that initiative leads
to attempt, which may or not result in a successful activity. In the example above all
attempts succeed.
This example demonstrates that LAO is capable of representing different types of
organizations and can be used to analyze their characteristics. However, it does not as
yet provide the means to represent the actual change from one to the other organization
structure. In order to be able to specify and analyze the process of moving from organi-
zation O to organizationO′, the LAO model needs to be extended with mechanisms to
describe organizational change. The dynamics of LAO are described in [15].
7 Related Work
Several approaches have been presented to investigate the complexity of reasoning
and analysis of multi-agent systems. Even though taking diverse perspectives, all ap-
proaches are concernedwith some of the requirements presented in section 1 above, and
can be basically divided into two categories: formal methods and engineering frame-
works.
Formalmethods forMAS have a logical basis, typically based on dynamic, temporal
and/or deontic logics [46,42,23]. However, often their treatment of organizational con-
cepts is in the sense that only specific issues are considered. The approach described
in [46] is based on ATL. In ATL logics, an operator is defined that expresses that a
coalition of agents controls a formula. I.e. ≪ C ≫ φ means that the coalition C can
achieve φ no matter what the agents outside C do. It is a kind of ensured achievement.
However, in order to be able to ensure this in a consistent way assume a complete di-
vision of agent capabilities and total control over the domain. This means that all basic
propositions can be controlled by exactly one agent. Although this provides a nice log-
ical system it is not very realistic as usually a proposition can be controlled by more
than one agent. In LAO, it is possible to express the possible interference of the agents
starting with basic propositions. The work presented by Santos et.al. in [42] also uses
attempts to achieve situations and therefore is closer to our approach in this respect
than ATL. However, that work lacks temporal issues. Therefore it is not possible to rea-
son about the difference that an action makes on the world. E.g. in LAO we can state
¬φ ∧ Eaφ stating that φ is false, but agent a will make it true. In a stit logic without
temporal aspects it holds that Eaφ → φ and thus the formula above would be incon-
sistent. Popova and Sharpanskykh [40] describe a ontological framework for modeling
and analysis of organizations based on TTL. The framework includes concepts and re-
lations partitioned into four dedicated views: process-oriented, performance-oriented,
organization-oriented and agent-oriented view. The framework can be used for repre-
senting different types of organizations ranging from mechanistic to organic. A similar
approach is that by Horling and Lesser [29]
Besides the formal, logical approaches towards organizational description and anal-
ysis there are also engineering frameworks. They provide sound representation lan-
guages that include many realistic organizational concepts, but have often a limited
formal semantic basis, which makes analysis and comparison difficult [30,35,45]. LAO
is able to provide a basis for formal semantics to these engineering approaches. We
already showed that it is possible to formalize some organizations described in quite
different approaches.
Some approach that also combines theory and practice is that about electronic in-
stitutions. See [19] for a description of a formal approach to describe electronic institu-
tions. This seems quite close to the work on organizations, because institutions are also
used to regulate the interactions between autonomous agents. However, there are some
important differences between organizations and institutions that lead to very different
requirements on their formal specification. The first difference is that the agents that in-
teract through an institution do not have to be aware of any objective of the institution.
They interact purely to try to satisfy their own objectives as good as possible. Therefore
the objectives of the institution do not have to be explicit and the actions of the agents
do not have to be linked to them. It also means that the delegation of parts of objectives
does not appear (explicitly) in institutions. Thus we do not need concepts such as power
relations, delegation and responsibility.
The second important difference is that institutions assume total control of the inter-
actions within the institution. Therefore the actions of the agents do not interfere with
each other. In organizations we assume that agents have more autonomy, because they
are meant to take care of (at least part of) the objectives of the organization. Local
knowledge and perspectives, different capabilities and power relations lead to possibly
inconsistent attempts of agents to achieve the objectives of the organization. This per-
spective of possible interference of actions of agents lead to a large part of the logical
framework dealing with the possible interference of actions and thus action attempts
instead of only successful actions. This is not necessary in institutions where the insti-
tution allows only those actions that lead to a successful outcome.
So, we can conclude that, although there is certainly an overlap between institutions
and organizations, they have different foci and requirements leading to quite different
requirements for their formal specification and thus the resulting formal frameworks are
by right quite different as well.
Computational organizational science tries to combine the organization theory and
engineering framework perspectives. It looks at groups, organizations and societies and
aims to understand, predict and manage system level change [4]. Several tools for the
analysis and modelling of organizations have been proposed. Computational models,
in particular those based on representation techniques and empirical simulation, have
been widely used for several decades to analyze and solve organizational level prob-
lems. More recently, mathematical tools, including those of decision and game theory,
probability and logic are becoming available to handle multiple agency approaches to
organizations. In practice, organizational level solutions are provided by mathematical
and computational models based on probabilistic and decision theoretic approaches. A
large body of work in this area is that of computational simulation, specifically agent-
based social simulation (ABSS) [8]. Computational simulations are based on formal
models, in the sense that they provide a precise theoretical formulation of relationships
between variables. Simulations provide a powerful way to analyze and construct realis-
tic models of organizational systems and make possible to study problems that are not
easily addressed by other scientific approaches [27]. Such formal models are however
limited to the specific domain and difficult to validate. Techniques are thus needed that
make possible the formal validation, comparison and extendability of simulation mod-
els. As far as we are aware of, the language presented in this paper, based on modal
logic is a first attempt to provide such a meta model for reasoning about computational
models, that has both a formal semantics as well as the capability to represent realistic
concepts.
8 Conclusions
Organization concepts and models are increasingly being adopted for the design and
specification of multi-agent systems. The motivations for this model are twofold. In the
one hand, the need for a formal, provable representation of organizations, with their
environment, objectives and agents in a way that enables to analyze their partial con-
tributions to the performance of the organization in a changing environment. On the
other hand, such a model must be realistic enough to incorporate the more ‘pragmatic’
considerations faced by real organizations.
In this paper we presented an attempt at a formal model for organizational concepts
based on [14], but now including roles and role enacting agents. Although the language
itself seems very rich, because it contains several modal operators, the semantics actu-
ally is only a relative small extension to that of CTL*. We added the set of agent, role
tuples to the state transitions to indicate which role enacting agents are influencing the
changes through this transition. This addition allows us to express not only abilities and
achievements of (role enacting) agents, but also their attempts to achieve a state. More-
over, we can define the same operators for groups of (role enacting) agents. Thus we
provide a uniform framework in which these different concepts can be expressed and
combined. Furthermore, we have presented initial steps towards a complete axiomatiza-
tion of LAO. The axiomatization presented here gives a good idea of the characteristics
of individual operators and some of the more important relations between operators,
but is not intended as a full account. We are currently extending LAO to include the
remainder requirements listed in section 1.
The current model is based on the notions of controllability, stit, attempt and ini-
tiative. In the language presented in this paper we did distinguish between the role (or
position) in an organization and the actual agent performing that role. By making this
distinction we have a means to compare two organizations with the same structure,
but instantiated with agents having different capabilities. However, in this paper we as-
sumed that agents playing a role will always attempt to fulfill the objectives of that role.
In reality agents might make different choices depending on their other commitments
and preferences. In [7] we already have shown how the agents can play roles in differ-
ent ways. This work could be added to the current framework to incorporate this aspect.
This also allows for the introduction of mental notions such as knowledge and belief in
the framework. These notions will become important when analyzing the performance
of organizations with a particular population of agents that might have their own goals
and are more or less cooperative, selfish, etc.
Finally, we will extend the model to include deontic concepts and their relation to
the operational concepts presented in this paper. Some of this work has already been
done and reported in [24,1]. However, combining the deontic notions with a logic that
can distinguish between attempts, achievement and non-performance of actions has not
been done before. It brings up interesting questions such as can one be obliged to at-
tempt an action? What is the difference with an obligation to perform the action? Can
the difference be checked? Related is the question whether a violation of an obligation
where an attempt is made to fulfill it is as ”bad” as a violation where no attempt is made
at all to fulfill it. We hope to answer some of these questions in future work.
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